#BrentfordFC v #QPR 12.30pm Griffin Park
The West London rivals match up in a game loaded with narrative.
Warburton returns (again)
QPR comfortably dispatched in the reverse fixture now wanting revenge.
Can Rangers spoil what is turning into an auto promotion chase for Brentford?
Can Brentford put 3 past QPR for the third time in a row?
QPR mainly play a possession based attacking 4-2-3-1.
This can fluctuate to a 4-3-2-1 or a 4-1-3-2 depending on Wells and Hugill selection plus the various combinations in midfield.
In the attacking phase we can see personnel come together into this shape.
Across the last 5 league games, Brentford have the more settled side with a concentrated batch of players playing the core minutes. These are complemented by small cameos from the bench.
Rangers have used two more players and have the greater spread of minutes.
We’re going to focus on the QPR areas that pose the most threat to a Brentford win.
Ebereche Eze has been one of the standout players in the Championship this season.
Using Eze as an attacking fulcrum has seen QPR boast one of the best attacking units in the division.
His progress from last season to this has been stark.
Heat Map of Eze actions in 18/19 - Steve Mclaren
In 17/18, Mclaren looked to have failed to capitalise on Eze’s passing ability, maybe seeing him solely as a tall, pacy winger, focusing too much on his physicality and using this to get on the outside of a left back.
Playing a far more direct style than Warburton, Mclaren liked Smith or Hemed in his forward line, with Wells giving the attack a different dynamic to challenging for knockdowns and avoiding playing through the thirds.
Left footed Freeman occupied the left hand side, which meant Eze was shifted around other areas of the pitch, mainly the right hand wing or filling in from the bench wherever needed.
The single most important thing Warburton has done with Eze is give him a defined role within the side. No longer is he a young player shifted all around the team positionally, he mainly starts from the left although allowed to position himself as a second striker, in a very similar manner to Benrahma, tasked with picking up the ball in the left half space and using his passing ability to play team mates into goals scoring positions or shooting himself.
Heat Map of Eze actions in 19/20 - Mark Warburton
This combined with his ability to dribble out of all situations, progress into space and use his frame and first touch to spin away from too tight defenders makes him almost impossible to control for 90 minutes of a game.
Dalsgaard and Norgaard will be the two players tasked with meeting Eze as soon as he receives the ball, aiming to prevent him from turning and looking forward to Wells or Hugil.
Mbeumo will oblige and be required to drop his position so that the right hand side of the pitch forms a defensive triangle shape around Eze, able to squeeze in on him once in possession.
Osayi-Samuel playing consistent minutes as the right hand wide forward is also benefiting the side.
Eze and Benrahma are out in the lead for league dribbles attempted, Samuel is just outside the top 10 and will break into that batch as the season progresses.
The 22yr old is a forward thinking player, offering his side good width with his positioning and able to combine his tricks with rapidly moving the ball into the final 3rd and penalty box.
Once in the final 3rd, he’s able to hold onto the ball well, wait for runners centrally or commit defenders before crossing or playing a pass. His game on the right side draws significant attention from the opposition, forcing them into doubling up on him and then controlling the space that tactic leaves behind. This in turn allows Eze and others to make blindside runs, enter the box unmarked or get 1v1 on the ball far side.
In the above snapshot, Samuel has recovered the ball from a Swansea clearance. Once in control of the ball, his main aim is to progress. Here, seeing the space and a teammate to his right, his next movements are naturally to progress, with the potential to attract 3 opposition players to this zone. The QPR attackers can see the play developing and from here drift away from the area Samuel is looking to move into, and into the right hand half space giving themselves a 2v2 centrally with Samuel the chance to find them with a pass or cross.
The left back has a decision to make in whether to follow the QPR attacker he is marking inside or let him run as he’s unable to pass him on with the gap between him and the LCB way too large.
This particular situation was defended well and Samuel was unable to get off a pass or cross towards the central areas, but you can see in a quick snapshot how simple movements and how the trigger of his direct running can turn a comfortable position into serious danger.
Warburton had early success as a coach due to his possession heavy, attacking principles. Full backs aim to stay high, 3 forwards occupy and switch between the 4 defenders. An attacking midfielder joins in and looks to link with forward players in picking up positions behind the opposition midfield.
The coaching of this style was innovative and shocked a number of lower tier sides with a continuous and suffocating wave of shots and forward passes.
With football tactics themselves being an answer to a question, there is always a counter-culture in development to answer this new question. It’s cyclical, and this is where Warburton's sides have failed to adapt.
Opposition coaches began to counter the attacking possession based sides by defending with a number of bodies narrow and compact across the box, pressuring teams to run out of patience, forcing them into speculative shots or aimless crosses. There is then plenty to be gained in transition.
Regularly, his sides would leave a high defensive line 2v1 on halfway, thus making counter-attacking highly profitable. In a reaction to counter-attacking, the theory around counter-pressing was born, the idea being that once the ball is lost, as a team you should shrink and home in on the ball if the situation permits.
It is optimal to make it as hard as possible for a team to create a transitional situation against you, a common feature a number of recently promoted and nearly promoted sides, Wolves, Sheffield United, Norwich, Cardiff and Leeds.
Thomas Frank has been the first Brentford coach in recent history to not only identify this flaw but build it into being a functioning part of team strategy.
Warburton sides do not yet appear to counter-press well or transition quickly from the attacking to defensive phase, instead leaving gaping holes right through the centre of the team.
When QPR and many of his previous sides attacking moves break down, a clearance or quick ball up field can turn the winning of a 50/50 dual or race to the ball between a forward and defender into a clear goal scoring opportunity.
When Eze is attempting his riskier passes, the risk / reward factor of these passes does not appear to be managed by the positioning of the rest of the team.
It begs the obvious question of how effective Eze could be in a more organised or defensively sound set up.
QPR has the attack to hurt any opposition in the division. The question for them and all of Mark Warburton’s' sides are what level are they performing at without the ball?
They will need to be at their best to stop Brentford.